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The design and construction processes create a complex supply chain in the construction 
sector. Because of the complex, inter-firm networks, the supply chain is fragmented. This 
results in process discontinuities horizontally, as the project passes through stages of work 
from one group of actors to another. In addition, it involves process discontinuities vertically, 
as work of all kinds is sub-contracted, often in multiple layers (Hughes, Gray and Murdoch, 
1997). This complex network of contracts is significant. It occurs not only because of the way 
that the process is usually organized but also because of the high level of risk attached to 
much of the work. Regardless of the type of contract, horizontal process discontinuities, 
accentuated by contractual obligations, are an inherent part of this network. These 
discontinuities have an impact on communications between stakeholders; specifically, 
communications that enable or inhibit innovation. Our focus is primarily on how these 
process discontinuities help or hinder the development and use of technological innovations in 
building, both as a process and as a product. There are several simultaneous reasons for the 
occurrence of these significant discontinuities in the process, making it a seriously difficult 
problem to resolve. 
 
With a focus on technological innovations in the building process and the building product, 
the key innovators are contractors and specialist sub-contractors. To bring an innovative 
product to market in the construction sector, the innovator must overcome these 
discontinuities, especially in the horizontal dimension where different organizations are only 
responsible for part of a project that create discontinuities. The discontinuities between 
demand for the building, specification of the building and installation of materials, 
components or equipment seem to be of specific importance as inhibitors to getting innovative 
technology to the market. The general contractor plays a pivotal role in coordinating the 
construction tasks and realizing a building. However, the practice of sub-contracting most of 
the work results in construction firms with little need of capital assets; this results in a 
“hollowed-out firm” that does not own the means of production for the construction process 
(Green, Newcombe, Fernie and Weller, 2004). They are paid for work in progress, and pay 
their sub-contractors for work in progress, resulting in a cash flow business with few assets of 
its own. Indeed, Chiang and Cheng (2010) show that this leads to low barriers to entry for 
highly competitive firms with little access to finance, posing a major barrier to innovation. 
They conclude that this holds back industry development. These conventional structures result 
in tasks that are typically split into different firms through a network of contracts. The 
institutional infrastructure of professional roles, standard-form contracts and traditional 
business models creates a lot of inertia and conservatism in the sector. The logic of 
contractors as hollowed-out firms is that actors that operate only within a specific task or 
within a specific phase of the project. The business model depends on the suppliers of 
technology being sub-contractors to cash-flow businesses with little in the way of assets, 
especially by comparison to the projects they build. The route to getting materials and 
components into a project involves contracts being set up with specifications of what is 
required before a supplier of technology is identified. This is both a horizontal and vertical 
discontinuity. It is horizontal because the specification is drafted at one stage and the installer 
identified at a later stage. It is vertical because the installer is (frequently) a sub-contractor to 
a contractor who was not involved in writing the specification. It might be said that it is 
difficult to conceive of a more effective way of preventing entrepreneurs with technological 
innovations from introducing their ideas in to the buildings they are contracted to contribute 
to. This phenomenon of the hollowed-out firm is an unintended consequence of the 
contemporary approach to construction contracting. It is the first obstruction to innovation. 
 
The major horizontal discontinuity between design decisions and construction decisions has 
long been recognized in reports on the UK construction industry (Emmerson, 1962; Banwell, 
1964; Latham, 1984; Egan 1988), which all commented on the discontinuity between the 
design and construction process. What is less obvious and, perhaps, more impactful, are the 
discontinuities at all the other stages in the overall process. The process runs from the need for 
development through to the operation of the completed facility. There may be discontinuities 
at every stage in this process, which could account for many of the issues that plague the 
construction sector and make it distinctly different from other industry sectors. For example, 
Hughes (1989), in four detailed case studies of the organization of UK public sector building 
projects, found that it was quite normal for a project to be in the capital planning stage for 
years until it becomes approved for expenditure, at which point, the entire project becomes 
the responsibility of others, with no further involvement from the capital planning team (and 
little access to all of the associated information and history about the funding decisions). 
These organizational characteristics of how projects progress from one stage to another form 
the second obstruction to innovation. 
 
Discontinuities in the process may be further understood through the theoretical framing of 
transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1979); i.e. the “make-or-buy” decision. TCE 
holds that such decisions will tend to be influenced by the differential costs of making vs 
buying, all other things being equal. We argue that, while this may lead to a more economical 
decision for the buyer, when the result is to contract out, a supplier then takes on the 
responsibility for procuring the goods or services and they, too, face a similar decision. In the 
construction sector, this often leads to the establishment of series of contracting-out decisions, 
each of which is a rational and economic decision for the buyer of the sub-transaction. In 
combination, these result in vertical discontinuities through multiple layers of sub-contracting 
and horizontal discontinuities through handing responsibility from one organization to another 
at successive stages. This combination of vertical and horizontal discontinuities is sub-optimal 
for the end user, who is far removed from the initiators of innovative, and even speculative, 
technologies. The successive, contracting-out decisions make it almost impossible for 
innovation to take place, if innovative entrepreneurs with ideas for new technological 
solutions are at the end of a long chain of sub-contracts. The need for suppliers of 
construction goods and services to maintain continuity of use for their resources is a third 
obstruction to innovation. 
 
One reason for the success and longevity of this discontinuous process is because construction 
often involves major decisions about capital development, where the price of land is the larger 
part of the equation, compared to the price of construction. Some developers of real estate 
lease their property and, in common with end-users, often engage with long-term revenue and 
operational issues. However, many developers seek to sell the asset on completion. Thus, in 
many cases, the major decisions in development are driven by the optimization of transactions 
around capital acquisition. This favours a market structure that prevents optimization of 
transactions around operational acquisition through revenue. These two aspects of capital and 
revenue are familiar to anyone who is familiar with construction. TCE, alone, does not 
account for the economic issues that prevent the construction industry from improving 
productivity and technological innovation. A business model focus provides specific 
questions that help to expose how the different business models required for success of 
companies at each stage and layer of the process are fundamentally incongruent. It is this 
incongruence of business models that explains a widespread lack of construction industry 
development (see for example Pan and Goodier, 2012, addressing off-site construction take-
up in relation to business models), and offers potential agendas for modernizing the industry. 
The role of construction in the development of real estate is a fourth obstruction to innovation. 
 
The aim is to investigate how an innovative technology gets to the market and to examine 
how the multiple obstructions to innovation may be overcome in practice. Two theoretical 
bases are adopted; transaction cost economics (TCE) explains make-or-buy decisions at 
multiple tiers and business development (BD) explains how different companies in the 
process respond to the way that demand is put to them and how markets for products are 
developed. TCE provides the basis for modelling the contractual relationships which can be 
observed in and between a variety of construction firms. BD provides the empirical basis for 
interviewing one actor in Sweden, whose business is developed around the emergence of 
innovations and productivity improvements. We explore some key questions such as how the 
construction firm positions itself in the market; how clients put demand to the market; how 
markets are altered by innovators; and what entry points into the market are used by the 
innovator. These two theoretical framings help to deal with all four obstructions to 
technological innovation in construction. 
 
Horizontal discontinuity in the process 
 
While vertical discontinuity through sub-contracting is well-known and virtually 
indispensable in construction contracting (see, for example, Hughes, Hillebrandt, Greenwood 
and Kwawu, 2006), less is written about horizontal discontinuity. Essentially, horizontal 
discontinuity is about the specific stages through which all projects must progress, involving 
hand-offs from one organization (or one part of an organization) to another, sometimes with 
overlaps and not always in the same sequence. These main stages approximate to:  
 
 Developing: someone has some real estate to develop or acquire 
 Funding: needed to pay for the development, perhaps also for the land 
 Designing: figure out, define and document what is needed 
 Managing construction: the construction work must be co-ordinated 
 Installing: specialists install equipment and carry out construction work 
 Servicing: such as heating, lighting, ventilation, etc. 
 Operating: facility operation is not usually the remit of construction sector 
 
The idea of horizontal discontinuity is that a different organization may be responsible for a 
part of a project at each of these stages. Some stages may be done in-house by certain types of 
organization but, even then, there are sometimes different parts of the organization 
responsible for carrying out the work. And, within this sequence of stages, there will, 
inevitably, be contracting out, i.e. vertical discontinuity, as the mix of specialized resources 
required is different in each project and, as stated earlier, it is uneconomic to keep them all in-
house as they cannot be kept continuously busy because the variety and variance in the 
building projects. 
 
At each stage, work is sub-contracted, and suppliers are enrolled into a project through a 
variety of contracting techniques. It is common to sub-contract and values up to 70% of the 
contract sum are not uncommon in housebuilding (Johnsson 2013); moreover, it makes sense 
to do so because of continuity of work. However, this involves putting the demand to the 
market such that parties may negotiate the terms of their contract (usually via competitive 
tendering) on assumptions about the kind of technology that will be eventually installed. This 
dominant approach to construction procurement is based on economic, organizational and 
business practices that unintentionally conspire to prevent innovative technologies getting to 
the market. Of course, in the construction management literature, these issues have long been 
recognized as significant. Because of this recognition, a variety of techniques have been 
developed in many countries for overcoming various kinds of discontinuity:  
 
 Direct relationships with suppliers as in construction management procurement (see 
Hughes, Champion and Murdoch, 2015: 69-79) 
 Integrated project delivery (Fischer, Ashcraft, Read and Khanzode, 2017) 
 Integrated supply chains (Cox and Ireland 2002) 
 Early contractor involvement (Gil, Tommelein and Ballard, 2004; Song, Mohamed 
and AbouRizk, 2009)) 
 Nominated sub-contracting, (Hughes et al. 1997; Hughes et al., 2015, p. 81-92) 
 Partnering (extra-contractual) and strategic alliances (Black, Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 
2000) 
 
One message that comes out clearly from the research cited in the list is that the most 
effective means of overcoming discontinuity is in creating a direct relationship between the 
client and the producer. Alternatively, it is about overcoming the problem caused by the lack 
of such a direct relationship through one or more of the integrating techniques listed above, 
some of which require resource and effort to bring them about. Something that is often not 
emphasized in the literature is that the client is not always the employer of contractor and the 
contractor is not always the producer of the technology. Thus, there will often be horizontal 
discontinuity between the end user and the supplier of a specific technology. 
 
In many cases, the specification of the work to be done is contracted out to a design team. 
Typically, they are not part of the same organization as the contractor or sub-contractor. The 
client of the process may be an end user, unknown at the time of designing and producing the 
building. Even if the end user is in direct contract with the contractor, the work tends to be 
mostly sub-contracted to others, who sub-contract again and buy their materials and 
components from a network of builders’ merchants. The merchants compete on selling 
catalogue items where the competitive advantage is price. The range of items is limited to 
reduce overheads and remain competitive. The sub-sub-contractor is not motivated or 
incentivized to buy anything but the cheapest product for installation, unless their contract 
specifies precisely what they are to install, through one of the contractual techniques for 
overcoming the process discontinuity. 
 
In some cases, particularly in sectors other than construction, rather than contracting-out the 
labour, a customer may just buy something in an instantaneous transaction. This transaction 
involves the supplier in all aspects of design, labour, manufacture and production. For this 
transaction to happen, the supplier must have been engaged in product development in the 
expectation of finding a customer, perhaps with this specific customer. A question that arises 
is, how could the buyer maximize the benefits of using innovative product development, 
before the event of establishing a contractual relationship? To illustrate this with an imaginary 
example. This example concerns the plight of an imaginary, specialist, engineering design 
company who has a new product that they wish to bring to market. To develop such a product, 
investment is needed. To find customers, requires contact with those responsible for making 
decisions in a project. If the designers and contractor are contracted to a client, the situation is 
difficult. The client has delegated decisions about what to build to the design team. The 
designers have professional indemnity insurance that precludes them specifying untried 
technologies, the contractor makes decisions about who to buy from based on their own 
supply chain and tendering processes. This leaves the innovative product designer with no 
route to market. So, how do innovative technologies in construction find their way to market 
in the light of the process discontinuities described so far? 
 
The problem we confront is that the specification of specialist technical work often takes 
place at a point that is either too early or too late, caused by the horizontal discontinuities 
present in all projects and exacerbated by vertical discontinuities in the supply chain. This 
seems to preclude the technology provider from influencing the choices that are made about 
what to incorporate into a building. Technology providers are brought into a project via a 
contract and technology procurers must decide whether to make or buy each kind of 
technology that is to be incorporated. Thus, the opportunities for introducing innovative 
technology into buildings are compromized by both kinds of discontinuities in many or most 




Transaction cost economics 
 
The ideas for this research are, essentially, rooted in transaction cost economics (TCE). While 
this is not analytical basis of the research reported here, it provides a useful context for some 
of the key issues. A series of ideas are brought together in TCE. 
 
 TCE analysis involves considering the cost of tendering vs costs of employment. All 
things being equal (ceteris paribus) the balance between these costs will dictate the 
choice that is made. In the construction sector, the difference between making and 
buying results in a serious inequality in the extent to which resources are kept fully 
occupied. Due to the diverse nature of buildings, the requirements for skills and 
materials are not consistent across projects. This makes life very inefficient for a main 
contractor who seeks to keep the resources in-house. Thus, they can successfully keep 
one trade in-house, such as concrete or steel, but no more than that. The flow of work 
must be regulated to keep that in-house resource fully occupied and the other 
resources are sub-contracted. The practice is so widespread at all stages and levels of 
construction that the result is a complex contractual network, or a “nexus of contracts” 
(Reve and Levitt 1984). The involvement of different participants through contracts 
between businesses, rather than contracts of employment, only serves to exacerbate 
the discontinuities between organizational units. 
 It is not claimed that firms make TCE calculations, but that “the invisible hand of the 
market” (as discussed in Thornton 2009) means that common business practices 
emerge because of natural self-interest and the market mechanisms of profits and 
prices (among other things). For example, firms who choose unwisely will be 
uncompetitive and inevitably become bankrupt. This is a compelling argument, but 
what if practices have become so entrenched, there is no competitive opposition to 
customary practices in the organization of projects? 
 TCE analysis involves considering costs under a range of headings. Hughes et al. 
(2006) listed these as market costs (buyers and sellers searching for information about 
each other); contract preparation costs (specifying requirements, choosing suppliers, 
fixing a price); monitoring and supervision costs (ensuring that what is being produces 
matches the specification); and dispute resolution costs (dealing with non-
conformances). These costs are extremely variable, difficult to capture and very small 
in relation to production costs. Therefore, it is not the costs of transactions that are 
significant, but the specificity of assets that creates the economic difference between 
make of buy decisions. 
 The narrative around TCE also involves ideas of bounded rationality, opportunism, 
hold-ups and information asymmetry. It is held that these ideas may also account for 
why the make-or-buy decision is sometimes problematic but, for our purposes, they do 
not define the discontinuities; in the process, they merely compound them. 
 
The construction sector seems to be characterized by a series of regular problems such as 
change orders, claims for extensions of time and for loss and/or expense. It may be misleading 
to characterize them as problems, since they are often a solution to a more profound problem, 
which, in its simplest sense, is the impossibility of predicting the future or creating certainty 
of information. Moreover, there are frequent problems brought about because of the 
discontinuities introduced into the construction process through sub-contracting. One key 
problem is that there is a time lag between creating the specification for construction work to 
be put to the market (tendering with general contractors) and carrying out the work of 
installation by sub-contractors. Worse, the sub-contractors who are installing complex 
equipment that requires detailed design and specification are faced with the difficulty of co-
ordinating this information with the design team. Third, the responsibilities for deciding the 
specification of the building require decisions about what to build to be taken by a design 
team, the decisions about who is to install the equipment to be taken by the main contractor 
and the decisions about how to install it to be taken by the sub-contractor. Fourth, 
construction planning and cost planning are surely instrumental in managing projects to a 
predictable conclusion. However, the traditional focus in contracting requires a focus on time, 
cost and quality, apparently to the exclusion of overarching agendas, such as stakeholder 
management, health and safety law, environmental impact, and intermittent supply of 
resources. These other agendas often lead to the basic scope requirements being missed, since 
they impose inescapable obligations on contractors and other suppliers. Importantly, the 
responsibility for the means of production does not lie with the actors who are taking the 
decisions about design specification or sub-contractor selection. Given this, TCE provides 
some insights into how and why construction work is organized the way it is. Essentially, the 
problems caused by the necessary separation of work into different organizational units are 
heightened when each organizational unit is a different firm enrolled through a transaction. 
This sets up the complex nexus of contracts scoped on a small sub-set of the governance 
issues in projects. Ultimately, it is this that presents the major co-ordination and control 
issues. A contractual, transaction-based focus, alone, does not provide a sufficiently rich 
picture for overcoming the lack of innovation and low productivity that we often see in 
construction. A fuller picture requires a broader focus, such as that offered by the business 
development literature. 
 
Business development in construction 
 
Parts of a business development framework provide additional insights for this work by 
offering a business model lens. The aspects of how business models explain the operation of 
the kind of firms considered in this work are: 
 
 A business model conceptualization considers how actors define the market they 
operate in. At the centre of market position is value-creation for customers and 
customer satisfaction but also the ability to be a legitimate actor in the business and 
institutional networks in the market. Following (Brege, Stehn and Nord, 2014), market 
positions are related to customers; but, also, to the business network and the 
surrounding institutional network. Indicators for how market position is attained are 
the customer and market segmentation/specialization; and the role in the building 
process (or in generic term supply chain). From a client point-of-view the business 
model notion of ‘offering’ boils down to how clients present demand to the 
construction market. 
 Salient business model literature (e.g. Zott and Amit, 2007) following Mintzberg’s 
(1983) notations about fit and congruence, view the business model as the money-
making logic and the ‘blue-print’ of how companies operate. Firms who do not 
consider the internal and external fit between the business model and the business 
environment (congruence) and between the business model elements and connections 
between the offering and market position to the source of funding for their work 
ultimately become uncompetitive.  
 The contingency idea of a fit business model may also help to explain how firms 
define and organize their supply chains. 
 
Construction businesses tend not to provide entire buildings to their customers, except in 
certain markets, such as housebuilding and commercial developments. There are many 
examples of so-called turnkey projects where the idea is that buyer finds a seller who will 
indeed provide everything (Lessing, Stehn and Ekholm, 2015). Most construction projects are 
not provided on a turnkey basis. The client has a make-or-buy decision that may be made at 
any point in the process, not simply at the first point of contact with the construction sector. 
Some clients carry out their own design; some co-ordinate their own construction sites; some 
provide and install their own specialist equipment, and some provide their own building 
services and operational aspects of the finished building. Some take on the responsibility for 
procuring stages of the process themselves, rather than asking a firm to take control of the 
whole process. Generally, large portions of the work are procured from the market, using 
suppliers who have developed an expertise in the relevant area. It is for the supply companies 
to consider what stages of the process they are providing and how they identify clients, secure 
contracts and set prices. This is what their business development activities entail. The point 
here is that it is difficult to make assumptions about how a project is being procured, even 
after a construction client has taken the procurement decision. Further, different types of firm 
in the process have distinct and different business models. 
 
In summary, the TCE framework helps us to understand why the complex contract network 
occurs and the business model framework helps us to understand how each business operates 




The empirical question that arises from the discussion so far is about how an innovative 
construction technology gets to market, when multiple contractual interfaces exacerbate the 
discontinuities throughout the stages and layers of the process by setting up a focus on 
contractual deliverables rather than fulfilling client and end-user needs with the best possible 
solution. To put this more simply, what would the construction process look like if those 
discontinuities were removed? Would innovation become a regular part of such a process, as 
the discussion implies? Do horizontal and vertical integration involve different business 
models? Following contingency reasoning there is not one best way to organize (Woodward 
1965), so what happens in different forms of organization? Under what circumstances can an 
innovative product be introduced into the design and construction processes? What kind of 
processes exist and are they amenable to the introduction of new products?  
 
Again, TCE provides an interesting insight into the operation of markets when work is 
contracted out, as discussed in Hughes et al. (2006: 16-20). To re-cap: for a buyer to approach 
the market, they need to carry out the work of ascertaining what is available to buy in the 
market. On the other hand, the seller needs to put information out into the market for buyers 
to discover. Second, there are costs associated with the task of negotiating the deal, specifying 
the work, choosing the supplier (perhaps through competition) and settling the terms of the 
contract. Third, the work must be monitored by the buyer to ensure that it conforms with the 
specifications. Finally, there are dispute resolution costs. The latter are not relevant in this 
paper. The point of the TCE argument is that it helps in identifying how the market operates. 
It raises interesting questions about how buyers find sellers and sellers find buyers. In many 
markets this is straightforward but, in the construction supply chain, there are added 
complexities. The processes that are described in TCE provide the context for the business 
models of those firms operating in the construction sector. TCE is about the transactional 
interfaces in the market; business models are about how a firm within the market operates. 
 
Much of the literature on TCE focuses on interfaces around a single organization (e.g., 
Williamson 1979). Similarly, much of the literature on Business Models focuses on how a 
single business organizes itself in relation to a market (Osterwalder, Pigneur and Tucci, 2005; 
Zott and Amit, 2007). From a production point-of view, what defines construction is the 
project-based type of production where the key points about construction work are that: 
 
 Construction tends to be a production factor for its customers;  
 The organization of construction is about the relationships between temporary and 
complex network of firms (the temporary multi-organization discussed by Cherns and 
Bryant 1984), held together with a network of contracts (Hughes et al. 2015), that 
creates complex interdependencies between organizations often lacking a single 
authoritative actor putting demands for or allowing for innovations … (Harty, 2008: 
1032); 
 The process occupies significant periods of time, which makes it difficult to predict 
the outcome; 
 The inputs and outputs of construction represent significant proportions of the annual 
turnover of buyers and sellers. This means, potentially, that every project, every 
transaction for some parties, has the possibility of threatening the business survival of 
every participant.  
 
To investigate the questions effectively, it is useful to reduce the variables. The empirical 
work for this research will focus on discovering and describing the business model and 
innovative tendencies for one case study company in a specific market. As an example, we 
focus on a Swedish housebuilding firm with an unconventional form of organization. Using 
the three-element business model construct of Brege et al. (2014), we sought empirical data 
on: 
 
 The offering: Market into which they are selling, price determination and 
revenue/capital mix; 
 Market position: Supply chain relationships and contractual interfaces; 
 Operational platform: Forms of organization. 
 
These elements are interconnected in the business model approach. The empirical questions 
are around whether certain combinations of these business model elements are associated with 




Leaning on the TCE and BD frameworks lead to a series of practical questions. In examining 
the activities of a firm in the construction sector, these questions evolve into an analytical 
framework. The purpose is to examine the way that this construction firm defines its 
market(s). We want to understand how they position themselves and what kind of supply 
chains they set up. By investigating a range of projects in the firm, the aim is to identify the 
points at which the client approaches the construction firm. Thus, the questions that provided 
direction for the case study were: 
 
1. How does the construction firm strategize and position itself in the market? 
 
 For each market, how do they find buyers? 
 To what extent does each market involve sub-contracting? 
 How does the firm introduce its own productivity-enhancing innovations in the supply 
chain, in each market it operates in? 
 
2. How do clients present demand in this specific construction market? 




The selection of the case study company involved identifying a firm in Sweden, whose 
business is developed around improved productivity and technological innovation. Data 
collection is a combination of secondary data published by the company in relation to how 
they see their own market position and interviews with directors of the firms to clarify and 
augment this information and ascertaining the details of specific innovation introduction 
incidents. Transcribed interview data was examined for specific innovations that result from 
how the firm positions itself in the market, especially in relation to entry points for innovative 
solutions.  
 
The focus of the interviews has, therefore, more to do with barriers and enablers in the 
organization of the process (horizontal discontinuity) and the supply-chain fragmentation 
(vertical discontinuity) than to do with the definition of the innovation per se. We argue that, 
to bring an innovative product to the market, the innovator must overcome these 
discontinuities. Successive contracting-out decisions may make it almost impossible for 
innovation to take place, such that innovation and productivity rely on a series of 
interconnected (and, potentially, incompatible) business models, potentially different for each 
firm in the supply chain. By selecting a firm that seems to operate without these 
discontinuities, the arguments in this paper would lead us to expect to see easier paths for 
innovation. 
 
The case of Lindbäcks Bygg 
 
Lindbäcks Bygg is a family-owned business. The original business, in the first generation 
(from 1924) of Lindbäcks, was a small sawmill. The emerging contracting business was 
separated from the sawmilling business in 1948 and in 1964 Lindbäcks Bygg was formed and 
worked as a local construction company. In 1982 they developed a planar-wooden-elements 
method of construction. In 1992, during in the Swedish Big Recession, Lindbäcks Bygg 
decided to move most of their on-site work inside a factory and then transport completed units 
to the building site. Lindbäcks Bygg constructs multi-storey dwellings in timber and the first 
project was built in 1994. About 11,000 units have been built, to date. A substantial part of the 
engineering work and assembly work on-site are made by their own personnel. Depending on 
the geographical market, Lindbäcks’ own personnel do all the assembly work on site; in other 
geographical market about 70% of the assembly work may be sub-contracted. However, the 
proportion of their own work (assembly and design/engineering) is steadily increasing. But 
exact figures are not known. In 1994, everything was built for their own real-estate company. 
Nowadays, about 70% of the production output is sold as projects, preferably under long-term 
partnerships and as a main contractor, and about 30% to their own real-estate company, where 
the real-estate company deal directly with the end-users. 
 
Lindbäcks Bygg concentrates it total business around a series of technological and process 
innovations collected into their building system platform. At the centre of the technology and 
productivity-driven platform are the volumetric elements. The volumetric elements consist of 
wall, floor, and ceiling elements assembled into a closed three-dimensional structure and 
various support systems. The volumetric elements are as complete as possible, including 
interior finishing, before being transported to the construction site. Every house is unique for 
each developer/contractor, but the platform is always the same. Substantial improvements to 
refine the platform in both specific methods employed as component and technical 
developments have taken place over the years. Based on a working method for experience 
feedback, the gradual refinement of the platform has been concentrated on, supporting IT-
systems and investments in automation of the production lines and business development 
forming subsidiary specialized products companies (for bathroom pods, balconies etc.). 
 
The market-restraining factor is the need to convince real-estate owners (other than 
themselves) to buy houses in this way. The traditional house in Sweden still tends to be a 
concrete house based on the developer/contractor specifications. Lindbäcks have to get into 
contract with a developer/contractor very early in the development processes, so that their 
requirements (thermal performance, balconies, height of building etc.) can be met by 
Lindbäcks’ platform requirements. The game-changer, or key selling point (much dependent 
on the developer/contractor’s choice of façade), is the payment method. The customer pays 
90% of the settled price when Lindbäcks starts the assembly process on the building site. The 
remaining 10% is paid when tenants start moving in. The customer needs only a very short-
term building loan to finance the construction part of the project, usually only 4-5 months. 
(the time on site is dependent on the choice of the type of façade). Since most of the work 
(about 75%) includes all resources put into the pre-work (winning projects, pre-design and the 
substantial part of pre-manufacturing in the factory) Lindbäcks have a bank guarantee to 
protect themselves against non-payment in case of the customer, for example, becoming 
insolvent. 
 
Analysis of Lindbäcks Bygg 
 
Lindbäcks Bygg have all but eliminated the horizontal and vertical discontinuities between 
stages and layers of the process of work that typifies the construction process; especially 
when they are suppliers to their own real estate business. This means that finding a customer 
and securing funding for a development is in their own hands. Thus, they control the demand 
for the products. By developing the off-site, volumetric-wooden-elements method of 
construction, they bring the fundamentals of the design and specification process in-house, 
removing the traditional horizontal discontinuity between responsibility for design and 
responsibility for construction. By making fully-finished volumetric units in their factory, 
they have complete control over the installation of the technological equipment in the 
completed buildings. This control of the means of production has also removed barriers for 
innovative product development, whether by themselves or by other suppliers/installers. By 
subcontracting specialist products to subsidiary specialized companies (for example, for 
whole bathroom pods), they control the specification and quality of the more complex 
technological aspects of the house. And by operating as a landlord, they are dealing directly 
with the final consumer of the product, i.e. the tenant. This provides them with direct 
feedback on the performance of their buildings. This results in an integrated process with very 
few contractual interfaces, limited to interfaces with subsidiary companies. As a single 
integrated company that owns, and takes responsibility for, its entire supply chain, one way or 
another, dealing directly with end-users, Lindbäcks Bygg represents an archetype for the idea 
of completely removing discontinuities in the processes that surround construction and 
development. Thus, they have opportunities for technological innovation that are more far-





The case displays interesting empirical evidence of effects of short-circuiting the omnipresent 
discontinuities in construction. The case shows that innovative solutions and developments of 
productivity improvements could be brought to the market. The off-site volumetric and 
development of complete building solutions was developed through a long-term series of 
entrepreneurial product and process innovations that created a direct link between the client 
and the producer. Through an integrated business model, Lindbäcks is acting as the client, 
technology provider and contractor. Lindbäcks Bygg clearly have a strategy to not only 
remove horizontal discontinuities between stages in the work but also the vertical 
discontinuities by removing most layers of sub-contracting. With the business development 
lens, it is clear we could see how Lindbäcks Bygg defined the market they operate in. They 
have created a business model that includes control of the stages and layers in the process, 
thereby putting themselves in control of the demand for the product through their control of 
the means of production. Control of the means of production, in this house- building sense, 
implies not only control of the stages of developing, funding, designing, managing 
construction and installing but also implementing technology innovations per se, e.g. the 
volumetric construction method or the building system platform. In other words, the 
Lindbäcks entrepreneurial innovation is their success at removing the horizontal and vertical 
discontinuities by creating an integrated supply chain, becoming suppliers to their own real 
estate business and making the decisions regarding design specifications and installations. In 
this way, they have used integration of the process as a purposeful integrating mechanism.  
 
Taking responsibility for all of the processes involved in a construction project, including the 
competing priorities between management control systems. One way to achieve a single point 
of governance and responsibility is the way that Lindbäcks Bygg have achieved it, but it is not 
the only way. Indeed, there are many construction sub-sectors where this could not work. But 
in those sectors, some of the other techniques for actively overcoming the process 
discontinuities are needed. It is not sufficiently clear from the research literature that the need 
for these techniques is more than just a slight increase in productivity or the continuation of 
long-term business relationships for their own sake. Indeed, it is the most imperative problem 
in the modern construction sector; someone has to have a role of governance and be in 
command of the decision-making processes, especially in relation to management control 
systems. It is this governance that it the key to successful completion of projects, whether 




Specifications required for contracts are often written before the technology installer is 
known. They focus on a limited range of criteria for success, which limits the opportunity for 
contracted suppliers to innovate in their process or their product. The technology installer is 
often restricted to providing something that has already been specified. The economics of 
construction tend to make sub-contracting inevitable. The independence of the design 
function prevents specifiers from engaging in dialogue with those who own the means of 
production. Because of this, contractors are generally not adding value, or they are disabling 
innovation, or they are preventing improvements in productivity.  
 
The case study shows a different approach for overcoming the conventional contractual 
boundaries in the development and supply of buildings. They are bringing highly innovative 
solutions to market and claim to make great productivity improvements. Full-scale off-site 
fabrication offers an opportunity to make this more like a manufacturing business than a 
traditional construction business. Vertical and horizontal integration open up the option of 
focusing on satisfying customer needs and requirements with every resource of the 
organization, rather than focusing on fulfilling narrowly defined contractual obligations. 
 
Our example shows how the perennial construction problems have been overcome in practice. 
Indeed, several techniques have emerged to overcome discontinuities in the process. This 
shows one route to enabling more effective dialogue between producers and buyers. But this 
requires much more sophistication than a mere contract. While much of this is self-evident to 
practitioners, we hope that this paper provides a useful rationale about why their instincts for 
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